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Abstract
Considerable advances have been made in our theoretical understanding of the behaviour
of legislative parties over the last 30 or so years, particularly in purposive theory. This
article reviews the current state of the literature on the important subject of legislative
party cohesion. How do we explain varying levels of legislative party cohesion? In the
first part of this article, I explore the difficulties encountered in identifying and measuring
a dependent variable that can be applied globally and comparatively to plenary votes in
democratic legislatures. The remaining discussion then reviews the extant empirical
evidence on how a multiplicity of systemic, party-levels, and situational factors
supposedly impact cohesion/discipline levels. The article makes clear that short-hand
differences, such as those between parliamentary and supposedly presidential systems,
or between different sets of election rules, do not provide complete answers because
every legislative chamber has a unique set of formal and informal election rules and
internal rules and procedures, is located within a different constitutional and cultural
context, and subject to influences emanating from different kinds of policies. The article
ends with a discussion of the possibilities and limitations of building comparative models
of cohesion/discipline and suggests the direction future must take.
John E. Owens is Professor of United States Government and Politics, The Centre for the
Study of Democracy, The University of Westminster, UK.
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Legislative party discipline and cohesion are important phenomena in the study of
political systems.  Unless assumptions are made that parties are cohesive and act as
unified collectivities with reasonably well-defined goals, it is really difficult, if not
impossible, to consider their electoral and legislative roles usefully. But levels of
legislative party cohesiveness are also important because they provide us with crucial
information about how legislatures/parliaments function and how they interact with
executives/governments. Without cohesive (or disciplined) parties, 1 government survival
in parliamentary systems is threatened because executive and legislative powers are fused
while in separated systems presidents' bases of legislative support become less stable.
How do we explain varying levels of legislative party cohesion? In the first part of this
article, I draw on the purposive literature to explore the benefits and costs to legislators in
democratic legislatures of joining and acting collectively and individualistically within
political parties. This discussion leads on to discussion of various conceptual and
empirical problems encountered in analysing intra-party cohesion and discipline in
democratic legislatures on plenary votes. Finally, the article reviews the extant empirical
evidence on how a multiplicity of systemic, party-levels, and situational factors
supposedly impact cohesion/discipline levels. The article ends with a discussion of the
possibilities and limitations of building comparative models of cohesion/discipline.
Legislative Purposiveness and Political Parties
Although important differences remain as to whether legislators are motivated
overwhelmingly by the re-election goal or by a combination of goals that also includes
power and good public policy,2 most explanations argue that legislators are purposive. In
order to achieve their goals, they typically join and work within political parties –
because parties offer the possibility of structured collective action with like-minded
copartisans, instant access to and identification with a brand name that can enhance
                                                
1 Although these concepts are analytically distinct, in that legislators may agree with one another ipso facto -
because of shared preferences (cohesion) or because they are persuaded or coerced into agreement with one
another (discipline) - they are empirically indistinguishable insofar as we observe legislators voting together to
some degree or another. So, a legislative party may appear disciplined in the sense that it is cohesive even
though little or no coercion (discipline) has been deployed. E. Özbudun, Party Cohesion in Western
Democracies: A Causal Analysis. Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 01-006, Beverley Hills, CA
and London: Sage 1970: 305.
2 David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection New Haven, CT and London, 1974; Richard F. Fenno,
Congressmen in Committees, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1973; Lawrence C. Dodd,
'Congress and the Quest for Power' in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered.
New York: Praeger: 1977 and Richard L. Hall, 'Participation and Purpose in Committee Decisionmaking',
American Political Science Review 81/1, 1987: 105-28.
3electoral prospects, provide them with potentially significant legislative resources,
including promotion to committee and leadership positions, and influence over the
distribution of patronage.3 Additionally, although this view has been challenged in the
context of weak congressional parties in the United States,4 and is complicated by the
incidence of minority coalition governments in many parliamentary systems,5 being a
member of the governing rather than the opposition party or coalition offers significantly
greater benefits.6
Much empirical evidence supports the logic of legislative purposiveness. Studies of
various legislatures – including the British House of Commons, the Danish Folketing, the
Portuguese Assembleia, and the Slovak Národná Rada – attest to the importance of
copartisans' shared policy preferences, emotional loyalties and moral commitments
underpinning tight party cohesion,7 as well as to how candidate nomination or selection
processes reinforce partisan proclivities.8 Even when legislative parties are not subject to
                                                
3 John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995: 21; Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'How Political
Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slim: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of Governments' in
Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, eds. Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government.
Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999: 23-48; Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count, Strategic
Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997;
John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Rank Ordering of Electoral
Formulas', Electoral Studies 14/4, 1995: 419.
4 Keith Krehbiel, 'Where's the Party?', British Journal of Political Science 23/1, 1993: 235-266 and Keith
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991; Keith
Krehbiel, 'The Party Effect from A to Z and Beyond', Journal of Politics, 61/3: 832-41.
5 It is well known that the fusion of powers in parliamentary systems does not necessarily produce majority
governments. See Kaare Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990: 8-9; Michael Laver and Normal Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of
Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990; and Jose Antonio Cheibub, Adam Przeworski and
Sebastian M. Saiegh, 'Government Coalitions Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism'. Paper presented to the
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2002.
6 Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan. Party Government in the House Berkeley, CA
and London: University of California Press, 1993; Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government,
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974.
77 John P. Mackintosh, The Government and Politics of Britain, 4th edn. London: Hutchinson, 1977: 75ff;
Edward Crowe, 'The Web of Authority: Party Loyalty and Social Control in the British House of Commons',
Legislative Studies Quarterly, XI/1, 1986: 161-85; Walter C. Opello, 'Portugal's Parliament: An Organisational
Analysis of Legislative Performance', Legislative Studies Quarterly, XI/3, 1986: 291:308; and Darina Malová
and Danica Siváková, 'The National Council of the Slovak Republic: The Developments of a National Parliament'
in Attila Ágh and Gabriella Ilonszki, Parliament and Organized Interests: The Second Steps, Budapest:
Hungarian Centre of Democracy Studies Foundation, 1994: 354, 357 and Table 11; Asbjørn Skjæveland, 'Party
Cohesion in the Danish Parliament', The Journal of Legislative Studies 7/2, 2001: 42; Christopher Kam, 'Do
Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour? Evidence From Great Britain and Canada', The Journal
of Legislative Studies, 7/4, 2001: 115; Jonathan Malloy, 'The High Discipline and Low Ideological Cohesion of
Canadian Parties', this volume and Edward Schneier, 'Party Leadership in the Emerging Parliament of Indonesia'.
Paper presented to the Biannual Conference of the Research Committee of Legislative Specialists of the
International Political Science Association, Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey, 23-26 June 2002: 17.
8 E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1942: 64; Susan Scarrow,
Parties and Their Members Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996: Moshe Maor, Political Parties and Party
Systems. London: Routledge, 1997; Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, 'Towards a More Responsible Two Party
4tight whipping – as on many free/conscience issues9 – or where party control over
nominations and cohesion is weak, shared policy preferences form an essential element of
intra-party cohesion and differentiate one set of legislative copartisans from opponents.10
The importance of shared policy preferences is augmented and reinforced by party
leaders' efforts - especially those of majority parties – to win collective benefits for their
party by controlling parliamentary timetables, invoking votes of confidence that trump
policy deliberations, deploying special rules that structure or limit debate, 11 or by casting all
party votes for their party; 12 and by using their tactical skills to buy off dissidents, limit
policy side payments (pork barrel, regulatory relief, or special executive interventions),
and use their control over significant political resources (committee assignments,
promotions to executive positions) to reward loyalty and sanctions to punish dissent.13 If
                                                                                                                                                
System. The British Party System Reconsidered. Paper presented to the annual meetings of the American Political
Science Associations, Washington, DC, 31 August- 3 September 2000.
9 David Marsh and John Hibbing, 'Accounting for the Voting Patterns of British MPs on Free Votes," Legislative
Studies Quarterly 12/2, 1987: 275-297; Phillip Cowley, ed., Conscience and Parliament, London: Frank Cass,
1998; Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart, 'Sodomy, Slaughter, Sunday Shopping, and Seatbelts', Party Politics, 3/1,
1997: 119-30; Charles Pattie, Edward Fieldhouse and R. J. Johnston, 'The Price of Conscience: The Electoral
Correlates and Consequences of Free Votes and Rebellions in the British House of Commons, 1987–92', British
Journal of Political Science, 24/3, 1994: 371; Deirdre McKeown and Rob Lundie, Free Votes in Australian and
Some Overseas Parliaments. Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, Current
Issues Brief No.1, 2002-03, 2002; Marvin L. Overby, Raymond Tallovich and Donley T. Studlar, 'Party and Free
Votes In Canada: Abortion in the House of Commons', Party Politics 4/3, 1998: 382.
10 Helmut Norpoth, 'Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes', American
Political Science Review, 70/4, 1976: 1156-1171; David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform
House: Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991; Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and
Lawmaking. The US House of Representatives in the Postreform Era Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995: 12-13.
11 Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: 90-102; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House;
Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking; Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith, Managing Uncertainty in the
House of Representatives. Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1988; Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives,
1977-1986' and Andrea C. Campbell, Gary W. Cox, and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Agenda Power in the U.S. Senate,
1977-1986' in David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., Party, Process, and Political Change in
Congress. New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002: 107-145
and 146-165.
12 Richard S. Katz, 'Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception' in Francis G. Castles and Rudolf Wildenmann,
eds., Visions and Realities of Party Government. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996: 42ff; Strøm, Minority Government and
Majority Rule; Laver and Schofield, Multiparty Government; Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, Parties and
Their Environments: Limits to Reform New York: Longman, 1995, ch. 6; Rose, The Problem of Party Government;
John D. Huber, Rationalizing Parliament. Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France, Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 82 ff, 279; Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, 'Cohesion
in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure', American Political Science Review, 92/3, 1998: 611-622;
Rudy B. Andweg and Lia Nijzink, 'Beyond the Two-Body Image: Relations Between Ministers and MPs' and
Herbert Döring, 'Fewer Though Presumably More Conflictual Bills: Parliamentary Government Acting as a
Monopolist' in Döring, Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe; George Tsebelis, Veto Players. How
Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ and London: Princeton University Press, 2002: 84-85; Carol Mershon
and William B. Heller. 'Party Fluidity and Legislators' Vote Choices: The Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996-
2000.' Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA.
August 30-September 2, 2001; Mikitaka Masuyama, 'Is the Japanese Diet Consensual?', The Journal of
Legislative Studies, 6/1, 2000: 18-24.
13 Bjorn Erik Rasch, 'Electoral Systems, Parliamentary Committees, and Party Discipline: The Norwegian Storting
in a Comparative Perspective' in Bowler, Farrell, and Katz, Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government: 121-
5cohesion is very high, sanctions become unnecessary; if it is very low, they become
unenforceable. Only if cohesion is sufficiently high that copartisans are willing to grant
their leaders sanction powers and low enough to make these necessary in the party's
collective interests can sanctions be used.14 Studies reveal a wide range of disciplinary
regimes ranging from expulsion from the party (as in the post-Communist Polish Sjem15)
or suppression of dissent where issues threaten party unity and/or generate discomfort
for the government (as in the case of the ANC in the South African Assembly16) to the
weak regimes available to leaders in the US Senate or the Brazilian Câmara dos
Deputados and Senado.17 Somewhere in between lie the disciplinary regimes within the
Italian Camera dei Deputati in the late 1990s, when the imposition of discipline was
always qualified by complex risk calculations that legislators would quit their parties if
discipline were too strict.18 However, even where strong disciplinary powers are
available, as in the British House of Commons, the degree to which they are effective will
depend on the specific policy issue and other situational factors, which explains why
various studies of different legislatures have shown that sanctions are often not used or
used ineffectively. 19
                                                                                                                                                
140; Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. The Secret
Garden. London: Sage Publications, 1988; Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development
of Political Parties in Victorian England Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; William Heller,
'Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments', American Journal of
Political Science 45/4, 2001: 780-98; Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking; Rohde, Parties and
Leaders in the Postreform House; Aldrich, Why Parties? 25-26; Cox, Making Votes Count; John H. Aldrich and
David W. Rohde, ‘Balance of Power: Republican Party Leadership and the Committee System in the 104th
House’. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 10 -13
April 1997; Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, 125; Sara Brandes Crook and John R. Hibbing,
’Congressional Reform and Party Discipline: The Effect of Changes in the Seniority System on Party Loyalty in
the US House of Representatives’, British Journal of Political Science, 15/2, 1985: 207-226.
14 For a similar point, see Bowler, Farrell, and Katz, 'Party Cohesion, Party Discipline and Parliaments': 5.
15 Irena Jackiewicz and Zbigniew Jackiewicz, 'The Polish Parliament in Transition: In Search of A Model' in Attila
Ágh and Gabriella Ilonszki, Parliament and Organized Interests: The Second Steps, Budapest: Hungarian Centre
of Democracy Studies Foundation, 1994: 373.
16 Christina Murray and Lia Nijzink, Building Representative Democracy. South Africa's Legislatures and the
Constitution', Cape Town: The European Union Parliamentary Support Programme, 2002: 14.
17 Barbara Sinclair, 'The Senate Leadership Dilemma: Passing Bills and Pursuing Partisan Advantage in a
Nonmajoritarian Chamber' in Colton C. Campbell and Nicol C. Rae, eds., The Contentious Senate. Partisanship,
Ideology, and the Myth of Cool Judgement. Lanham, MD and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001: 65-90; Scott
Mainwaring and Aníbal S. Pérez-Liñán, 'Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress', Legislative
Studies Quarterly, XXII/4, 1997: 477.
18 Mershon and Heller. 'Party Fluidity and Legislators' Vote Choices': 23-24.
19 Philip Cowley and Philip Norton, 'Rebels and Rebellions: Conservative MPs in the 1992 Parliament', British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 1/1, 1999: 84-105; Sam Depauw, 'Parliamentary Party Cohesion
and the Scarcity of Sanctions in the Belgian Parliament, 1991-95', Res Publica, 1: 15-39; Gerhard Loewenberg,
Parliament in the German Political System. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967: 356-5; Werner J. Patzelt,
'Party Cohesion and Party Discipline in German Parliaments', The Journal of Legislative Studies, this volume:
xx.
6Joining a legislative party and seeking to maximise the benefits of collective action,
however, requires individual legislators to incur substantial transaction costs. These costs
increase proportionally the greater the distance between the legislator's preferences and
the legislative party's median point, the further the party's median point is from the
median point of the party activists or voters in the individual legislators' constituency, 20
and the greater the unpopularity of the government or majority party.21 In order to
obviate or limit involvements in the cumbersome, divisive, and expensive agreement-
reaching processes within the party and the need to satisfy large swathes of the
electorate, a legislator primarily motivated by re-election might opt instead for an
individualist or factional representational strategy that entails directly and selectively
compensating identifiable supporters in his/her geographic constituency with pork barrel
legislation (e.g. leggini in the Italian system) or political patronage.22 Various institutional
and other structures might encourage the legislator to pursue such a strategy, thereby
undermining the strength of parties. In the Baltic States, Brazil, Colombia, and the United
States, for example, parties simply do not provide candidates with many campaign
resources (volunteers, campaign finance, consulting services, etc.) and so they must
generate their own.23 In the Italian Camera dei Deputati and the Japanese Diet, such
resources are provided on a localised fractional basis24 and so loyalty tends to be given to
the faction, with similar consequences for party fragmentation and dissent. The absence
of party resources for campaigning might be compounded by voters' ignorance of their
representatives' behaviour in the legislature or lack of interest in national issues. In these
circumstances, legislators will have every reason to run on local issues, rely on symbolic
                                                
20 Susan Scarrow, 'The Paradox of Enrolment: Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Party Memberships', European
Journal of Political Research 25/1, 1994: 45; Arthur T. Denzau, William H. Riker and Kenneth A. Shepsle,
'Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style', American Political Science Review, 79/4, 1985:
1118, 1132.
21 Even in America's separated system, where blame avoidance for one's party performance is much easier, the
president's party has historically lost congressional seats in mid-term elections.
22 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: 73; Carey and Shugart, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote': 418-19.
23 Marcus Kreuzer and Vello Pettai, 'Patterns of Political Instability: Affiliation Patterns of Politicians and Voters
in Post-Communist Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania' in Studies in Comparative International Development, 38/2,
forthcoming 2003; Barry Ames, 'Party Discipline in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies' in Scott Morgenstern and
Benito Nacif, eds., Legislative Politics in Latin America, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press
2002: 193; Barry Ames, 'Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the
Brazilian Congress', Journal of Politics, 57/2, 1995: 324-343; Rachael E. Ingall and Brian F. Crisp,
'Determinants of Home Style: The Many Incentives for Going Home in Colombia', Legislative Studies Quarterly,
26/3: 487-512; Richard F. Fenno, Home Style. House Members in Their Districts. Boston, MA and Toronto: Little,
Brown and Co. 1978; Richard F. Fenno, Senators on the Campaign Trail. The Politics of Representation Norman,
OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.
24 Giuseppe Di Palma, Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament. Berkeley, CA: The
University of California Press, 1977: 55-63; Raphael Zarinski, 'Intra-Party Conflict in a Dominant Party: The
Experience of Italian Christian Democracy', Journal of Politics, 1/1, 1965: 3-33; Giovanni Sartori, Parties and
Party Systems: A Framework For Analysis. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976: 88-90,
90-99; Masaru Kohno, Japan's Postwar Party Politics. Princeton, NJ and London: Princeton University Press:
91-115; Gary W. Cox and Frances Rosenbluth, 'The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan',
American Political Science Review, 87/3, 1993: 578-579.
7or personal appeals, build 'personalistic proto-organisations'25 and electoral connections
with their constituents that are nonpartisan or based on links with party fractions rather
than a party as a whole.
So, there is a trade-off for legislators between the attractions of the collective goods
offered by legislative parties – and the need, therefore, to stick with the party and sustain
its cohesion - and the loss of discretion and freedom of action to follow one's conscience,
to privilege loyalty to one's faction or local party activists over national legislative
leaders, or represent the views of one's constituents should a conflict between these
sources of influence arise. The nature of trade-offs will vary according to the institutional
and other contexts, which are discussed later. Before exploring those contexts, however,
let us consider how the theories rehearsed so far might be systematically tested – using
some measure of cohesion to create dependent variables and the contextual factors as
independent variables.
Most studies of legislative party cohesion adopt a case study approach. That is, they
report information and test explanations based on single legislatures. Therein lies a major
problem: almost all the findings derived from single cases are not open to refutation by
counter examples, unless one takes the view that the particular system is unique, in which
case the hypotheses advanced cannot be falsified.
Measuring Legislative Party Cohesion
If we are to operationalise legislative party cohesion – create a dependent variable - for
the purposes of systematic comparative empirical research, key decisions need to be
made about what kind of data is most appropriate and/or available. Typically, researchers
resort to roll call data, which is simple, flexible, ready understandable, and hard. Scholars
who focus on certain legislatures, notably the US Congress, take for granted the
availability of individual legislators' yeas and nays on roll call votes; and as a consequence
have developed a large sub field of research,26 although too often until quite recently the
more difficult task of relating party cohesion and discipline to theoretically-driven models
of individual legislators' voting calculus was given insufficient attention.27 Even a cursory
investigation reveals that roll call data are not available for many democratic legislatures, at
least for lengthy periods of time. 28 Most votes in the Italian Camera dei Deputati were
                                                
25 Kreuzer and Pettai, 'Patterns of Political Instability'.
26 Melissa P. Collie, 'Voting Behaviour in Legislatures' in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson, and
Malcolm E. Jewell, eds., Handbook of Legislative Research. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University
Press, 1985: 471-518.
27 Aage R. Clausen, 'The Measurement of Legislative Group Behavior', Midwest Journal of Political Science 11/2,
1967: 212-24.
28 Within Europe, data are available for Austria, Belgium, Britain, the Czech Republic (1993-98), Denmark,
Finland, Germany (between 1970 and 1973), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia (1996-97), Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Data are also available for
8taken by secret ballot before 1988, and not recorded. In the Dutch Tweede Kamer, the
French Assemblée Nationale (under the Fourth Republic), the German Bundestag, the
New Zealand House of Representatives, the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados, the
Venezuelan Asamblea Nacional, and other legislative chambers, party leaders cast votes
for the entire party and only the positions of parties is recorded.29 Indeed, for most of the
time most voting in most legislative chambers is semi-open or anonymous.30
But, apart from problems regarding the availability of roll call data, there are other
important questions of comparability - because the compositions of data sets vary
according to differences in legislative rules and decisionmaking styles, technology,
patterns of legislative organisation, and party competitiveness – and reliability, in terms
of whether roll call data accurately capture patterns of intra-party cohesion. In some
legislative chambers, literally thousands of votes are recorded each year, in others, less
than 50. 31 Legislative voting rules vary considerably: whether proxy voting is allowed (as
in the New Zealand House), how absences are treated,32 and which votes are subject to
                                                                                                                                                
Argentina, Australia (1996-98), Brazil, Canada (1994-97), Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Israel (1999), Mexico
(1998-2000), New Zealand (1990-94), Nicaragua, Peru (1999-2001), the Philippines (1995-98), and Uruguay. See
Thomas Saalfeld, 'On Dogs and Whips: Recorded Votes' in Herbert Döring, ed., Parliaments and Majority Rule in
Western Europe, Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag/St Martin's Press, 1995 and 1996: 535, 548-49; Kam,
'Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour?': 89-126; John M. Carey. 'Getting Their Way, or
Getting in the Way? Presidents and Party Unity in Legislative Voting.' Paper prepared for delivery at the 2002
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29-September 1, 2000: Table 2.
29 Rudy B. Andeweg, 'Executive Legislative Relations in the Netherlands: Consecutive and Coexisting Patterns',
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17/2, 1992: 167; Manuel Sanchez de Dios, ' Parliamentary Party Discipline in
Spain' in Bowler, Farrell, and Katz, Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government; Michael Coppedge, Strong
Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1994.
30 Other legislatures, including chambers in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal,
Slovenia, and Spain, continue to permit secret voting on certain votes. Chambers in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay impose restrictions on calling for roll call votes, which in some cases are
severe. Saalfeld, 'On Dogs and Whips': 535; John M. Carey, 'Visible Votes: Recorded Voting and Legislative
Accountability in Latin America'. Paper presented to the conference on Exporting Congress? The Influence of the
US Congress on World Legislatures, Gordon Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship Studies, Florida
International University, Miami, FL, 6-7 December 2002: 8. In the New Zealand case, however, individual MPs
may cast votes against their party once the 'party votes' have been taken. Fiona Barker and Stephen Levine, 'The
Individual Parliamentary Member and Institutional Change: The Changing Role of the New Zealand Member of
Parliament' in Lawrence D. Longley and Reuven Y. Hazan, eds., The Uneasy Relationships Between Parliamentary
Members and Leaders. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000: 118.
31 The extreme cases appear to be the post-communist Russian Duma (which recorded 2.600 votes in its first year)
and the Czech Poslanecka Snemovna – but recorded votes in the British House of Commons, the Danish
Folketing, the Israeli Knesset, the Norwegian Storting, the Polish Sejm and the Swedish Riksdag also usually
exceed 1000 votes per session. At the other extreme, however, votes were rarely recorded in the Argentine
Cámara de Diputados, the Austrian Nationalrat, the Colombian Cámara de Representantes, the Costa Rican
Asamblea Legislativa, the German Bundestag (in the 1960s and 1970s), the Guatemalan Congreso, the
Indonesian Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of People's Representatives) the South African National Assembly,
and the Uruguayan Parlamento. See Saalfeld, 'On Dogs and Whips': 538; Thomas F. Remington and Steven S.
Smith, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly XX/4, 1995: 476;
Carey, 'Visible Votes': 33; Özbudun, Party Cohesion in Western Democracies.
32 In many legislatures, absences are recorded leaving the researcher to figure out how to treat them. In the Danish
Folketing, however, absences are not recorded whereas in the Russian Duma, non-voting is counted as a nay vote
and is very commonly used (especially by right wing and party-list deputies) because successful motions must
9roll call votes, which in turn is affected by aspects of legislative organisation within the
chamber. For example, in the US House and Senate and the Brazilian Câmara dos
Deputados unresolved issues are allowed to proceed to the floor, allowing sometimes
hundreds of floor amendments to be offered, which are subject to roll call votes; whereas
in most parliamentary systems there is much tighter agenda control. In the contemporary
Italian Camera dei Deputati and Senato, there are numerous problems to do with the
discretion given to committees to make final voting dispositions, the use of floor votes
only to approve final laws, and the high incidence of party switching (discussed later), as
well as the continued use of secret voting. The peculiarities of voting rules in different
legislative chambers then render comprehensive crossnational or longitudinal analysis
based on roll call data extremely problematic, if not impossible. For these reasons, many
scholars resort to other data.33
Even when roll call data are available, measuring party cohesion and discipline solely
through roll call analysis throws up some well-known problems. Although the data are
hard, because they measure voting only at the floor stage of decisionmaking, they may not
tap important intra-party or inter-party differences present at the pre-floor stages.
Secondly, by definition roll calls record only legislators' visible preferences. Legislators
are able to voice dissent by other means, as for example through early day motions in the
British House of Commons, private members' initiatives or amendments, or through
informal channels.34 But, more importantly, the sample of roll call votes in a legislative
session is necessarily selective. Much legislative activity involves nondecisionmaking,
which touches on the important role played by legislative leaders of the governing
coalition - not only in manipulating rules and procedures to structure legislative choices
and shape legislation but in keeping issues that entail considerable political risks off the
legislative agenda: allowing a floor debate and votes on some issues would publicise
significant intra-party divisions, perhaps offer opportunities for the minority party to
forge bipartisan coalitions with dissidents, and damage the party's legislative reputation.35
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In the extreme, nondecisionmaking degenerates into Di Palma's 'surviving without
governing' phenomenon; where the apparent cohesion of the Italian parliamentary parties
is a façade that conceals highly factionalised and polarised parties, the near absence of
major governance decisions, and governments' lack of authority over their own
parliamentary coalitions.36 To a certain extent, the incidence of universalistic or 'hurrah'
voting – as in the United States Congress - also imports biases into roll call analyses.37
Thirdly, in any systematic comparative inquiry controls need to be entered that make
distinctions between those roll call votes that induce leadership involvement and/or
discipline, and those that do not. The former are likely to be the most useful to
researchers interested in leaders' abilities to discipline copartisans, so long they can be
certain that supposedly free votes were not whipped. 38 The latter – which will include
votes on such issues as abortion, genetic engineering, stem cell research, homosexuality,
and war – are more interesting to analysts focussing on copartisans' policy preferences.39
However, the distinctions do not end there. Votes on important and politically salient
issues necessitate major active involvement/whipping by governing party/coalition leaders
(and presidents, in separated systems) where those issues divide the major
parties/coalitions - because they risk the reputation of the governing party/coalition and
constitute de facto or de jure confidence votes, possibly precipitating dissolution and
elections in a parliamentary system or ceding potential political advantage to the minority
party in a separated system (which may also hold the presidency). Other major
politically salient issues may not necessitate whipping either because copartisans are
already predisposed to supporting the party position or because legislative leaders have
calculated that they could relax discipline and permit dissent in the certain knowledge that
they already have enough votes to avoid damaging the party's reputation, or because the
opposing parties/coalitions do not oppose the position of the governing party or
coalition.
Finally, assuming roll call analysis is contemplated, there are important methodological
issues. Lowell's concept of a 'party vote', defined as a vote where 90% of one party
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opposes 90% of the opposing party40 has the advantage of pointing up differences across
legislatures dominated by two parties (e.g. Britain and the United States) but is
unworkable for most European multi-party chambers. Moreover, its 90% party level
threshold is arbitrary, ignores votes where party cohesion is weak, and therefore cannot
tap longitudinal changes in party cohesion over time, say, from 50% to 89%.
Congressional Quarterly's uses the notoriously lower 50% versus 50% measure in the
United States, which has the effect of inflating the unity of congressional parties.41 Even
lower thresholds designed to accommodate multiparty legislatures are equally
problematic, and make crossnational comparison impossible or of limited value.42 Other
studies that use individual roll calls as the unit of analysis and then calculate cohesion
coefficients on the basis of probability theory 43 allow comparison of cohesion across
different policy issues and across parties but do not take account of consensual voting, do
not provide measures of individual legislators' party loyalty, and contain significant
statistical biases.44 Where researchers use these or similar indices or W-NOMINATE
factor scores,45 they typically do not distinguish between minor and major issues.46
Notwithstanding the difficulties in operationalising and measuring party cohesion for
comparative analysis of democratic legislatures - whether using roll call data, surveys of
legislators, or other measures - it is clear that a) the vast majority of legislators accept the
benefits of joining and organising legislative parties. (In a sample of 18 legislatures, less
than 1% were independents - the outliers being Ireland and Japan);47 and b) most
legislators cohere strongly with their copartisans. Space prohibits the presentation of
these data but suffice to state that the most prominent incohesive legislative parties are
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found in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Guatemala, Honduras, France (1945-1968),
Italy, Japan, the United States, and Uruguay. 48
Before discussing the influence of various contextual factors on cohesion, let us consider a
second dependent variable that provides valuable insights into the dynamics of intra-
party cohesion and discipline. This is the strategy of exit. Quite simply, some legislators
are unwilling to pay the transaction costs of belonging to one legislative party and opt for
a more extreme form of dissent that involves switching their allegiance to another party.
As we will see, the phenomenon is quite common in the newly democratic legislatures of
eastern and central Europe and Latin America, as well as in some moderately old
democracies, including Italy and Japan.
Party Switching
Although there is no reliable crossnational data or study of switching, the literature shows
considerable divergence across democratic legislatures: whereas just 31 British MPs
switched parties between 1950 and 1996, just 20 members of the United States House
and Senate between 1947 and 1997, only four Canadian MPs between 1997-2000, five
members of the Norwegian Storting in the 1990s, and no members of the Finnish
Eduskunta,49 'faction hopping or parliamentary tourism' has been rife elsewhere, at least
during specific periods. The phenomenon is particularly strong in the Brazilian Câmara
dos Deputados, the Colombian Cámara de Representantes, the Ecuadorian Congreso, the
post-Nazi German Bundestag, the post-Suharto Indonesian Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat,
the Israeli Knesset, the Italian Camera dei Deputati and the Senato, the Japanese Diet, the
post-apartheid South African National Assembly, and in a host of post-communist
legislative chambers in Russia, eastern and central European and the Baltic states. 50 In
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one particularly egregious case, a Czech MP changed his party affiliation three times in
the space of just one year.51
Why do legislators switch parties? First, it is important to note that many party switches
are to parties within the same ideological 'family' or major coalition groups.52 Although
these cases highlight parties' weak boundaries in these chambers, when they are eliminated
from an analysis, the effect is to reduce switching levels to levels similar to those found in
Britain and Canada. Second, following the purposive logic, legislators switch if they
perceive that their goals are not well served by their existing partisan affiliation and they
perceive the transaction costs incurred in switching (including various institutional rules,
being part of the governing coalition, levels of partisanship among the voters, and other
features of the party system) are not high. So, in Australia, Britain, Canada, South Africa,
and most west European systems switchers lose the party's nomination and their seats,
either immediately or at the next election (unless some fudge is agreed, as in the South
African case),53 as well as their credibility with the voters, because they are elected
essentially as party representatives rather than because of their individual qualities.
Similarly, many conservative southern Democrats in the US House of Representatives
(who were ideologically closer to the Republican Party than to their northern liberal
colleagues) were until very recently prevented from switching by the benefits of being
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members of the majority party almost without interruption between 1932 and 1994,
better access to federal largess and greater policy influence (notably on civil rights) than
they would have had if they had switched to the 'permanent' Republican minority. Once,
however, Republican voting in the south increased, transaction costs were reduced, and so
the incidence of switching increased, albeit marginally. More generally, however, in open
and uncertain political markets of the kind found in many Latin America and post-
communist legislatures in the Baltic and eastern and central Europe - where electoral
support for parties is volatile and/or party systems are shifting, where boundaries
between parties are fluid, where parties provide very few electoral resources, are weakly
institutionalised and lack ideological distinctiveness, where conflictual relations between
executive and legislatures inhibit party responsibility, and where legislators are guaranteed
nomination for re-election even if they switch parties - the transaction costs are much
lower, the ties between legislators and their parties are much weaker, and the incentives to
switch parties or become independents are higher.54 Under such conditions, legislators do
not develop strong incentives to invest in their parties or stick with them. Instead, they
become vulnerable to vote buying and better offers of institutional position or access to
government largess (for example, by joining the majority or presidential party/coalition),
which are made all the more attractive by their closer policy affinity to the new party;55
or they are persuaded to switch by a combination of policy considerations and better
electoral opportunities, which might be related to constituency demands;56 or they prefer
to switch to a larger party. 57 The consequences of switching – or the threat of switching -
are that party leaders become less able to develop coherent policy agendas, less able to
forge intra- and inter-party majority/governing coalitions, and less able to impose strong
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constraints on their copartisans. If they do seek greater intra-party coherence, they risk
permanent defections to other parties.58
What contextual factors then affect legislators' proclivity to stick with their parties? A
priori, we should expect the political decisions of purposive legislators in democratic
legislatures to be constrained by a range by factors to do with the political system in
which they operate, the party to which they are affiliated, and the peculiarities of the
decisionmaking situation - which together comprise the legislators' strategic environment
and structure choices that they and their colleagues must make.
System Context
Legislators' propensities to address collective action and social choice problems through
their party will vary according to the resources that they can marshal and the incentive
structures provided by different institutional and situational contexts. All political
systems are different, as are legislators' host parties and the specific situation that they
encounter at any given time.
System Stability and Maturity
Legislators need time and resources to build party and other organisations and to
coordinate agreement around a common programme. A priori, it seems plausible that the
maturity and stability of a democratic regime would affect the level of party cohesion and
party fluidity - because the content of party reputations would be more uncertain and
contestable in the earlier years than subsequently, in part because of the previous
system's legacies.59 To take an extreme example, in post-communist Russia, there was no
pre-existing organized opposition movement or party system or no negotiated transition
where relatively organized opposition forces bargained with leaders of the previous
regimes over the nature of new parliamentary institutions, as there was in eastern Europe.
As a consequence, even after the emergence of more democratic processes in Russia, basic
institutional arrangements remained unsettled, particularly in relation to Duma-
presidential relations, and Russian voters exhibited considerable fluidity and instability in
their partisan and policy preferences. 60 As in other post-authoritarian emerging
democratic regimes - in Germany, the Baltic States, eastern and central Europe, and Latin
America - parliamentary representatives were uncomfortable with the concept of 'party',
wary of individual party reputations, and experienced extreme difficulty in settling their
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loyalty to different parties and the executive. 61 Similarly, when a pre-existing party
system is decaying, as in France during the 4th Republic62 or Italy or Japan in the 1990s63
- or realigning, as for example in the United States in the 1850s or after the 1970s in the
south64 - political instability and party fluidity increases, and legislative party cohesion
remains low: purposive legislators want to survive politically, so they dissent from their
copartisans, sometimes develop individualistic electoral connections, sometimes switch
parties,65 and sometimes opt out of the system altogether as legislative careers lose their
value.66
Yet, system immaturity and instability cannot be a sufficient condition for low legislative
party cohesion or party fluidity. For, important variations have been found across
transition systems – for example, in Latin America between Brazil and Argentina, in
eastern Europe between legislatures in Polish, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia,67 and in
the Baltic states between Latvia and Estonia. Moreover, as Sartori has argued, in mature
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party systems where the same party wins elections repeatedly over time – as, for
example, in post-war Italy or Japan - party leaders will find it difficult to dissuade
legislators from pursuing individualistic representational strategies associated with
patronage and clientelism (state jobs, social housing allocations, government contracts,
and so forth), to prevent factionalism and impose party discipline when the party has
little prospect of losing.68
Let us turn now to institutional explanations, which are the most common in the
literature.
Electoral Rules
Politicians' purposive strategies are affected by electoral rules and norms that govern who
becomes a candidate, what types of campaign activity are permitted and encouraged, and
how the ballot is structured. Institutionalist explanations of legislative party cohesion and
discipline pay considerable attention to ballot structure. Specifically, where electoral
institutions force legislators to compete with copartisans for preference votes, where
there is no provision for pooling votes within entire party lists, where party leaders exert
weak control over nominations, and where constituencies tend to be numerically larger,
legislators tend to pursue individualistic rather than collective electoral and legislative
strategies. So, where voters in multi-member districts are allowed to vote for individual
candidates rather than party lists, legislative candidates and party factions develop strong
incentives to compete with one another for the support of party voters rather than as
representatives of a single collective brand name. Single-member constituencies also tend
to facilitate more personalised electoral competition and electoral connections between
legislators and voters but, importantly, they do not allow voters to choose among
different party candidates, and party leaders or activists retain strong control over
candidate nominations. If, however, the selection of candidates in multi-member
constituencies rests with legislative incumbents, party activists, or the electorate, rather
than with party leaders (who can favour certain candidates/incumbents over others in list
rankings), there will be stronger incentives for legislative individualism than under single-
member constituency systems.69
Yet, the empirical evidence on the impact of different electoral rules is inconclusive.70
Studies point to the importance of other important factors among systems that share the
same ballot structure. Closed list multi-member PR systems - such as those used for
elections to the Argentine Cámara de Diputados, the Austrian Nationalrat, the Czech
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Poslanecka Snemovna, the Danish Folketing, the German Bundestag, the Dutch Tweede
Kamer, the Norwegian Storting, the Swedish Riksdag, the South African National
Assembly, or the Venezuelan Asamblea Nacional – seemingly provide legislators with
little scope for developing personalised electoral connections and representative styles,
because legislative careers are heavily dependent on party leaders who retain centralised
control over nomination procedures and decide whether incumbent legislators and other
party candidates are placed on the party's electoral list and in what order.71 And, in all
these legislatures, party cohesion is very strong and party fluidity weak. Contrastingly, in
open list PR systems – such as those used for the Italian Camera dei Deputati before
1992, the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados, the Colombian Cámara de Representantes,
and the Uruguayan Parlament - where party leaders have no formal control over the order
of candidates' election and voters are able to give their preference votes to candidates not
on the party lists, legislators develop strong incentives to develop personal rather than
party reputations and their representational strategies are linked to distributive politics;
and the effects are to weaken legislative party cohesion. 72 Single non-transferrable voting
systems with personal preference voting and non-pooling of votes (as, for example,
Japan's system until 1994), produce similar effects, as do the primary election systems in
Israel and the US, which force party candidates to compete with one another and to
remain loyal to their local primary voters rather than to national party leaders.73
Yet, the interactive effects of electoral rules and party cohesion within the legislature do
not end there. For, there is a good deal of evidence that shows that some closed list
systems – notably Austria, Belgium, and Venezuela, where parties are programmatically
vague and weakly differentiated on major policy issues - generate incentives for legislators
to pursue individualistic representational strategies, as in open list systems.74
                                                
71 E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942: 157; Rasch, 'Electoral
Systems, Parliamentary Committees, and Party Discipline': 121-140; Mark P. Jones, 'Explaining the high level of
party discipline in the Argentine Congress' in Morgenstern and Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America;
Michael Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994; Murray and Nijzink, Building Representative Democracy: 14. See
also Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1980: 115-124.
72 Richard S. Katz, 'Intraparty Preference Voting' in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphard, eds., Electoral Laws
and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon, 1986; and Mainwaring and Shugart, 'Presidentialism and
the Party System'; Ames, 'Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation'; Sartori, Parties and
Party Systems: 93-100; Cf. David J. Samuels, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-Centric Electoral
Systems: Evidence from Brazil', Comparative Political Studies, 32, 199; Matthew S. Shugart, 'Leaders, Rank and
File, and Constituents: Electoral Reform in Colombia and Venezuela', Electoral Studies, 11/1, 1992: 21–45;
Ingall and Crisp, 'Determinants of Home Style': 487-512.
73 Mathew D. McCubbins and Frances M. Rosenbluth, 'Party Provision for Personal Politics: Dividing the Vote in
Japan' in Peter F. Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press: 33-55; Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional
Elections. 5th edn. New York and London: Longman, 2001: 11-15; Reuven Y. Hazan, 'Yes, Institutions Matter:
The Impact of Institutional Reform on Parliamentary Members and Leaders in Israel' in Longley and Hazan, The
Uneasy Relationships Between Parliamentary Members and Leaders: 314-317.
74 Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 1995: 180-184.
19
Conversely, some parties in open list systems – notably the Brazilian Workers Party in
the Câmara dos Deputados, the fujimoristas in the Peruvian Congreso and the Broad
Front in the Uruguayan Parlament – as well as legislative parties in the British and
Canadian single member systems are as cohesive75 as many parties found in closed list
multi-member PR systems. The picture is complicated further by the contradictory
experiences of legislatures that have mixed electoral systems or have changed their
systems. While single-member legislators in Italy's post-1994 and Germany's mixed
systems pursue more individualistic representational strategies than their party list
colleagues the same is apparently not true of the mixed-member Russian State Duma.
Moreover, the shift to a more majoritarian system in Italy has apparently not diminished
legislative individualism; while the change to a less majoritarian mixed proportional
system for elections to the New Zealand House of Representatives has not significantly
affected MPs' dispositions to toe the party line.76
Even so, ceterus paribus, there is little question that electoral rules do have pervasive and
significant effects. Certain forms provide legislators with better opportunities and
stronger incentives to emphasise personal over party reputations, with consequences for
cohesion: the weaker central party leaders' control over access to and orderings on ballots,
and the larger the numerical size of constituencies (but only if the voting system
encourages the cultivation of personal reputations), the greater the propensity for party
candidates to be elected by personal votes, regardless of whether or not voters cast a
single or a preferential ballot, and the weaker intra-party legislature cohesion becomes.
The Structure of Executive-Legislative Relations
A second important institutional factor is constitutional. The logic of parliamentary
government typically requires cohesive governing parties to facilitate the enactment of the
party programme, patronage, and sustain the government.77 For individual governing
party or coalition legislators, this means sticking with their party in order to maintain the
flow of policy and other benefits and in extremis avoiding precipitating new elections in
which they may not be reselected or re-elected. In separated systems that accord
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presidents substantial legislative powers, legislators have fewer incentives to value
collective party goods and/or provide legislative support for the executive - because
voting against the president and/or losing a particular vote in the legislature does not
necessarily weaken the party or the individual legislator's chances of  nomination or re-
election. Indeed, the logic of separated systems encourages ambitious politicians to seek
and gain the highly valued and esteemed office of president independently of legislative
party support or sometimes by promoting a new political party. In each case, the effect
is to disrupt the cohesion of their legislative party or coalition. 78 Following a presidential
election, moreover, presidents are then obliged to construct discrete partisan or bipartisan
supporting coalitions on different policy issues, sometimes on the basis of patronage or a
willingness to become presidential clients. 79 As the experiences in France, Israel, the
United States, and various Latin American systems demonstrate, separated systems
undermine the primacy of collective representation; weaken legislative party cohesion and
other intra-party connections, and produce 'presidentialized parties'. 80
Again, there is considerable empirical evidence that questions the supposed differential
effects of parliamentary and separated systems on legislative party cohesion.
Parliamentary systems differ in more ways than how their members are nominated and
elected.81 In many parliaments, legislators are sometimes encouraged either by their local
party activists (who control nominations) or by local voters to vote against their party;
and often they do so with impunity because those activists or voters will continue to
support and renominate them. In brief, at least some legislators in parliamentary system
are able to cultivate and sustain a personalised electoral connection akin to those found in
many separated systems.82 Second, there will be situations when party MPs will vote
against their government even to the extent of bringing it down, because these outcomes
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are preferred to the status quo.83 In summary, the fusion of the executive and legislature
that is supposedly a characteristic feature of parliamentary systems is not always
sustained and as a consequence legislative dynamics similar to those found in separated
systems come into play. Third, there are sharp differences in legislative efficiency
between legislators - say, between the British House of Commons (high) and the Italian
Camera or the Korean National Assembly (low). 84 Intra-party cohesion levels are
therefore much more significant in Britain than in Italy or Korea. Fourth, evidence shows
that even the most cohesive parliamentary parties experience variations over time,
especially as the legislative agenda changes.85 Fifth, there is strong evidence that despite
the absence of fusion between the executive and the legislature in separated systems
presidents exert considerable influence in the legislature, especially in dealing with their
own party and especially on budgetary, foreign and national security issues,86 which in
certain systems (notably Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela,) often amounts to
effective presidential control not dissimilar to executive dominance in many parliamentary
systems.87
For all these reasons then recent theoretical research emphasises more the extent to which
and where different political actors exercise veto power over decisionmaking processes
and policy choices, and how executives in both parliamentary and separated systems
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encourage intra-party cohesion through policy appeals, pork barrel, patronage, and other
resources that are highly valued by legislators in pursuit of their goals. 88
Federal systems
A third major institutional factor is also constitutional. Federalism tends to weaken party
cohesion in national legislatures because parties are required to organise on a regional or
state basis. Inter-regional and interstate conflicts are then projected into legislative parties
at the national level making it more difficult for leaders to construct broad partisan
coalitions as legislators heed voters and party leaders in their constituencies. Thus,
studies of legislative behaviour in Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Russia and the United States
show that typically when legislators are cross-pressured between district and party or
between local and national party leaders, local influences usually win.89
A moment's thought, however, points us to other federal systems where legislative unity
is very strong (such as Australia, Canada or Germany) and to non-federal systems (such
as Israel) where local control over candidacies is significant and party cohesion is
weakened as a consequence.90 Moreover, studies of the Argentine Cámara de Diputados,
Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados and Senato, and the US House and Senate show that on
high salience issues that are important to the majority party leaders are able to devise
effective strategies that to some extent reduce the effects of federal and constituency
diversity and enhance cohesion.91 These findings should not be surprising. They serve to
underline how the effects of institutional structures are mitigated by a complex array of
political actors and incentives that also influence legislators and their parties. So, federal
structure may simply be laid over significant difference in regional political cultures – as,
for example, historically between the north and south in the United States. Furthermore,
while federalism creates new regional or state political actors and interests that may
conflict with national interests, it cannot be assumed that all legislators representing the
same state, province or region will have the same partisan affiliations, the same policy
preferences, the same types of constituencies or the same influence on a given legislator -
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and so federalism will interact with localism, local party activists and leaders, the party
affiliations of local officials, and party strength among local voters for the support of
legislators from the same state.92
Any complete examination of the impact of system features on legislative party cohesion
would need to include the impact of other institutional features, including legislative
voting rules,93 forms of legislative organisation (including the decisionmaking authority
enjoyed by committees as, for example, in the Italian parliament), 94 as well as the
existence of electronic voting (which makes visible how individual legislators vote and
potentially increases their vulnerability to constituency and group over party
pressures).95 Once again, however, we must expect multiple and interactive causal effects.
As crossnational research on electronic voting has shown, much depends on how aware
voters are of their representative's legislative voting behaviour, whether or not voters
evaluate legislators' performances by their voting records, whether or not other
institutional factors are at work providing incentives for voters to reward or punish
legislators who support or oppose their national party or president over local
constituents, and whether these factors trump the efforts of legislative leaders or
presidents to maximise cohesion.96
Finally, crossnational comparative research needs to consider the importance of socio-
economic and political cultural factors. Thus, we might surmise that individualistic rather
than partisan electoral connections might be particularly characteristic of poorer societies
with high levels of illiteracy and low-skilled jobs, little geographic mobility, and few
channels of mass communications. In these societies, individual citizens tend not to be so
interested in or value highly macro-policies enunciated by programmatic parties; instead
voters may find short-term, localised, benefits provided by patrons in exchange for their
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votes more attractive.97 Similarly, the extent to which a system's political culture upholds
individualistic over collective representational and social integration values would likely
have a negative effect on legislative party cohesion. Studies of intra-party cohesion in
Britain and Denmark, for example, cite 'trust in their party' and 'the best interests of the
party' as important values persuading many legislators not to object to decisions whereas
other polities would see these values as alien. 98
Although systemic factors are undoubtedly useful in explaining legislative party unity,
they are clearly insufficient to account for much of the variations in legislative cohesion
levels both across and within systems.
Party-Level Factors
A further complicating set of factors impacting intra-party cohesion is the reputations
and organisational peculiarities of particular parties within the same system, including
how party representation is distributed geographically. Even in those legislatures that
exhibit the highest levels of cohesion, it is evidently more difficult to maintain cohesion in
some legislative parties rather than others.99 Indeed, variance in party unity across parties
within single systems may be as great as that across different systems.100 Some studies
have found that cohesion is correlated with party ideology - left wing parties are usually
more cohesive than others - but others have found greater unity in right wing or centrist
parties. 101 Given the benefits of a party controlling the legislative majority and/or the
executive in a separated system, and presumably greater access to patronage and other
resources with which to influence copartisans, it might be anticipated that intra-party
cohesion would be greater within the governing party or coalition than within opposition
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parties/coalitions.102 However, there is little reason to conclude that this would be the
case where, as in Brazil, Italy, Japan, and the US, other system features (such as the
electoral system and/or presidential influence) encourage legislators to pursue
individualistic representational strategies and inhibit parties' capacities to act as cohesive
and responsible collectivities. Where governing and opposition parties do offer
themselves as cohesive and responsible collectivities, moreover, there is the additional
complication that no matter how large the governing party/coalition's legislative majority -
or indeed, whether it enjoys a majority at all - certain issues will shatter unity and
support, especially if the proposed action is unpopular with the voters, as the British
Government (with a parliamentary majority of 167) discovered in March 2003 when 138
Labour MPs rebelled against a three-line whip on a vote to go to war with Iraq.
Moreover, as the previous discussion suggested, where the same party wins control of a
chamber repeatedly, legislators' incentives to remain cohesive may be weak.
Finally, the logic of a party governing or acting as part of a governing coalition might
suggest that cohesion will be greater where their legislative majority is small or
nonexistent. Under those conditions, leaders will use their powers to keep contentious
issues off the agenda and only bring forward those proposals that enjoy majority support
within the governing party or coalition; and in parliamentary systems, these dynamics
will be reinforced by the higher proportion of the governing coalition being members of
the government – or the 'payroll vote' - and, therefore, subject to the additional and more
powerful norms of collective responsibility. Where, however, the governing coalition has
an overwhelming plurality in the legislature diminishing marginal returns take effect and
the number of veto players increases, as the range of values and interests in the party that
leaders need to satisfy widens and the scope for defections increases.103 In practice, of
course, as the earlier discussion showed, legislative leaders may be able to use their
powers and skills equally effectively under different pluralities – or even when they are
the minority in parliamentary systems - to manipulate legislative situations, shape the
legislative agenda, structure decisions and enforce discipline.
Situational Factors
Finally, we may identify various situational factors that further complicate the effects of
system and party factors. The last section touched on the special status of the governing
party or coalition, whether it is the majority party in the legislature under a separated
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system or the majority or minority governing coalition in a parliamentary system. In
practice, the significance of a legislative party's governing status is also likely to be
affected by the juxtaposition of the governing and opposition parties. The logic of
governing status suggests that members of the governing party or coalition will find it
easier to stick together when they are opposing either the agenda of the opposition party
or the executive (if controlled by the opposing party) than it would be for them to remain
cohesive in support of their own cabinet's agenda, particularly if issues are controversial
within the party but popular among the electorate. Although the logic for this claim seems
strong, there is no systematic crossnational study to support it, only limited evidence
from single legislatures.104 A second important situational factor is the impact of policy
on politics: 105 different types of policies produce different levels of electoral saliency and
importance to parties and/or different groups of constituents, which in turn produce
different levels of intra party cohesion. 106 Over time, wholesale agenda changes can
produce temporal changes in cohesion levels and even party switching. Again, however,
there is no systematic cross-national analysis, only studies of single legislatures.107
When, as well as which, issues reach the agenda is also important. Typically, there are
strong incentives for party and coalition legislators to stick together immediately
following an election victory. Indeed, a number of studies show legislative party cohesion
is greater earlier in a legislative term compared with close to a pending election, as the
flow of future benefits resulting from unity within the current legislature shrinks and
difficult decisions that have been postponed have to be addressed.108
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Through the medium of purposive theory we can better understand the dynamics of intra-
party cohesion within the legislature. In particular, we learn that while there are many
benefits for legislators in affiliating and cohering with their parties there are also many
costs, which in certain circumstances they are unwilling to bear. When, however, attempts
are made to test this theory empirically in a cross-national comparative research design,
two common and intractable problems emerge. One is an inability to devise a common and
reliable measure of intra-party cohesion, the dependent variable. The second relates to
explanations - the independent variables - that are not confined to simplistic differences
between parliamentary and supposedly presidential systems, or between different sets of
election rules. Rather it is that every legislature has a unique set of formal and informal
election rules and internal rules and procedures, is located within a different constitutional
and cultural context, and subject to influences emanating from different kinds of policies.
In the social science jargon, we have a classic degrees of freedom problem that heavily
circumscribes attempts at systematic crossnational comparison.109
Even so, the direction in which scholars need to go is clear. As reported here, recent
research suggests that many constitutional and institutional distinctions are effectively
shorthand for various incentive structures that are built into and develop within different
systems. So that the reality of legislative decisionmaking – and therefore intra-party
cohesion - is much more complex than constitutional and institutional formalities, and
appears to depend more on the extent to which values are shared among copartisans and
decisionmaking is coordinated and centralised within political cultures that uphold
collective values. On this reading, stronger intra-party cohesion is most likely to emanate
from formal and informal processes – including not only disciplinary but also agenda-
setting processes – that are centrally coordinated either by governing parties or coalitions
in parliamentary systems or by presidents and legislative party leaders in separated
systems. Weaker cohesion is more likely to be found in systems that are less susceptible
to centralised coordination; which are those in which significant nomination and
decisionmaking power remains at the local level.110
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Notes.
